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1. Introduction 
Recurrent real estate and mortgage booms have shown that surging house prices 
and mortgage market expansions tend to coincide. This has been the case in the 
US subprime boom as well as in recent real estate booms in Spain, Ireland and 
other Eurozone economies. It also applies to more recent booms in Norway and 
Switzerland. Yet the direction and channels of causality between house prices and 
mortgage markets have largely remained unclear.
1
 
 
This paper addresses the issue of causality by instrumenting house prices with 
the exogenous component of immigration. We obtain the latter by means of an 
“origin push” or “shift share” strategy invented by and previously used in the 
literature on immigration and employment, and that on immigration and house 
prices. It isolates variation in immigration resulting from “push factors” operating 
in immigrants’ countries of origin rather than “pull factors” at their destinations. 
By use of canton, year and month fixed effects, we can furthermore focus on 
variation between different neighborhoods located within the same labor market 
and public policy environment. This removes many effects immigration may have 
on other outcomes. With micro data on individual mortgage requests and offers 
we control for detailed applicant and object characteristics, in contrast to previous 
shift share papers that typically had to rely on aggregate data. We also investigate 
how the causal effect of house prices varies with some of these characteristics. 
More importantly, observing for each request the supply responses of different 
lenders allows us to distinguish to what extent house prices affect equilibrium 
mortgage lending through mortgage demand and to what extent through supply.  
 
1
 For more examples, see IMF (2011) and Igan and Loungani (2012). 
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We find that a 1% higher house price increases the requested mortgage amount 
by 0.52%. The non-causal partial correlation between house prices and mortgage 
demand however amounts to 0.78% due to reverse causality from mortgage 
amounts to house prices. This points at a mutually reinforcing mechanism 
between real estate and mortgage market booms and busts. By contrast, higher 
house prices are not found to induce lenders in our sample to expand mortgage 
supply: Instead, lenders make ceteris paribus fewer offers and charge higher risk 
premiums the higher the house price. This cautious lending behavior is 
particularly pronounced in the second half of our sample. During this period 
house prices have already gone through an extended period of growth and hence 
are more likely to be overvalued. The caution is also particularly pronounced for 
mortgage requests with high loan to value (LTV) ratios, but does not depend on 
the request’s payment to income (PTI) ratio. It is also more pronounced for 
applicants requesting adjustable rather than fixed rate mortgages. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 first covers 
different theories of how real estate prices, mortgage demand and mortgage 
supply could be causally related, and then provides a brief summary of the as yet 
limited evidence on the topic. Following this, Section 3 introduces our data and 
Section 4 our empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 
summarizes the detailed robustness checks presented in our Online Appendix. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Theories and existing evidence on links between house prices and 
mortgage volumes 
We investigate the causal relationships behind the correlation between house 
prices and mortgage volumes for the case of Switzerland. Figure 1 illustrates this 
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correlation by displaying the annual growth rates of respectively apartment prices, 
single-family home (SFH) prices, and mortgage volumes for the years 1971-2013. 
While there are also idiosyncratic factors at play, the growth rates clearly appear 
correlated. As for timing, it would if anything appear that mortgage volumes 
slightly lag house prices, although any such observation must at this stage remain 
tentative given the small number of observations. To shed light on the potential 
causal relationship between house prices and mortgage volumes the literature 
offers three major hypotheses, which we sketch in blue in Figure 2. 
 
Firstly, there may be a positive causal effect running from house prices to the 
mortgage market via mortgage demand. This is because more expensive houses 
lead potential home buyers to demand larger mortgages, as they cannot finance 
the increased cost for a given size and quality of housing only out of their savings. 
Looking at housing as an investment rather than solely a consumption good, 
higher current house prices may furthermore trigger expectations of higher future 
prices. For given levels of income and financial wealth, higher loans also imply 
higher LTV and PTI ratios. High PTI ratios, i.e. high annual debt service 
payments relative to regular annual income, reflect an increased risk that 
borrowers cannot meet their interest and amortization obligations. By contrast, 
high LTV ratios reflect the risk that after a price drop the collateral will not be 
sufficiently valuable to compensate lenders when  borrowers are struggling to 
repay.  Conditional on their balance sheets and regulatory requirements, banks
2
 
may satisfy increased mortgage demand, but only in return for higher risk 
premiums and hence higher mortgage rates. Higher mortgage demand does then 
result in higher equilibrium mortgage amounts, also absent an outward shift in the 
mortgage supply curve. 
 
2
 In our empirical setup, some mortgages are offered by insurance companies. For simplicity, we shall nonetheless use 
the terms “banks” and “lenders” interchangeably. Further, we shall often write “house” for both houses and apartments. 
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Secondly, house prices may also exert a positive causal effect on mortgage 
supply: If banks deem higher house prices sustainable and hence the collateral 
more valuable, they may be willing to lend more. Thus Igan and Loungani (2012) 
write: “Real estate plays an important collateral role and lenders tend to become 
more willing to extend loans when collateral values increase”. This idea is 
formalized in the model by Bruckner et al (2011), where higher house price 
expectations ease mortgage lenders’ default concerns.3 
 
A third possible link between house prices and mortgage volumes runs in the 
opposite direction: from mortgage volumes to the housing market. Under that 
scenario, banks shift the mortgage supply curve by making a larger share of 
applicants an offer or by offering more attractive mortgage rates. The resulting 
easier access to mortgages allows more potential home buyers to enter the market 
for owner-occupied property, and allows each of them to afford a more expensive 
house, thereby bidding up house prices. Thus Geneakoplos (2010) presents a 
model in which some buyers are more eager to buy a house and so have a higher 
reservation price than others. If these buyers are extended enough credit, 
equilibrium house prices will be higher than if some of the most eager buyers are 
kept out of the market. In an extension of this work, Fostel and Geneakoplos 
(2012) show how leverage and tranching first raised US house prices, and the 
introduction of Credit Default Swaps then lowered them. 
 
On top of these three possible causal relationships, both house prices and 
mortgage volumes  are of course also exposed to other economic  developments. 
A particularly important factor influencing house prices and mortgage volumes 
 
3
 Alternatively, careful banks may instead respond to higher house prices by restricting  the mortgage amounts and PTI 
ratios or by charging higher risk premiums. This alternative behavior would reduce rather than increase pro-cyclicality. 
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are interest rates. Low interest rates may increase mortgage demand, as they make 
larger mortgage amounts affordable. At the same time, low interest rates may 
diminish the risk-adjusted returns that lenders can earn on other assets and hence 
increase the willingness to supply mortgages. In our empirical setup we implicitly 
control for the effect of interest rates by way of year and month fixed effects.
4
 
Another possible source of noise in our setup is high income growth. Thus in 
some past booms there has been feedback from house prices to mortgage demand 
via income levels in the construction sector. In the Swiss setup investigated 
though this is not the case: In the period under consideration, the median wage in 
construction grew as slowly as that across all sectors (1.3% p.a.). Furthermore, 
despite the house price boom the share of workers employed in construction has 
remained constant at about 8%. In any case, any other macroeconomic 
developments, are being controlled for by canton, year and month fixed effects, as 
explained in more detail below.  
Another possibly idiosyncratic shock to house prices however arises from 
population growth and in particular immigration. Figure 2 illustrates immigration 
as an idiosyncratic shock to house prices by means of a red arrow. We explain 
below which components of immigration may under which conditions indeed be 
considered as idiosyncratic or exogenous, i.e. as having a direct effect on house 
prices but not on mortgage volumes. 
 
Understanding the relative importance of different causal links between house 
prices and mortgage volumes is not only of scientific interest. It  is also crucial to 
design appropriate policy measures: If causality runs mainly from mortgage 
lending to house prices (hypothesis 3 above), then policy measures targeting the 
mortgage market should be able to effectively address both mortgage and house 
 
4
 The effect of interest rates is analyzed explicitly in a forthcoming companion paper. 
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price growth. If by contrast observed growth rates ensue from a shock to house 
prices that is exogenous to the mortgage market, then mortgage market measures 
alone may be able to slow down the credit expansions, but are unlikely to suffice 
to also affect house prices. Of similar importance is an understanding of whether 
house prices have a more positive effect on mortgage demand or on mortgage 
supply. In the former case, demand-side measures should take center-stage. These 
may include changes to the tax deductibility of mortgage debt, or restrictions on 
the LTV or PTI ratios with which households can apply for a mortgage. In the 
latter case by contrast policy-makers may wish to increase banks’ marginal costs 
of mortgage lending, e.g. by use of higher capital requirements.
5
 
 
We are aware of three papers that have sought to tackle empirically the two-
way causality between house prices and mortgage volumes. Firstly, Adelino et al 
(2012) instrument mortgage supply in the US with annual changes in the 
conforming loan limit, the maximum loan amount with which a mortgage can still 
be purchased and securitized by the US government-sponsored enterprises. They 
find that houses which become eligible for a conforming loan end up costing $1.1 
or 0.5% more per square meter. They conclude that access to cheaper funding was 
a significant driver of the US subprime bubble, even if it cannot fully account for 
the price increases. Similarly Favara and Imbs (2011) exploit post-1994 US 
branching deregulation to compare mortgage origination of regulated and hence 
affected lenders to that of independent mortgage lenders. They find that the 
increase in mortgage supply attributable to branching deregulation raised annual 
house price growth by up to three percentage points. Mian and Sufi (2011) 
approach the same two-way causality issue from the real estate side, 
 
5
 Crowe et al. (2011) provide a detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of different policy instruments. 
Kuttner and Shim (2013), using a panel of 57 countries and more than 3 decades, find specifically that demand side 
measures and in particular PTI limits have a larger effect on mortgage expansions than supply side measures, and only tax 
policies can robustly affect house prices. 
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instrumenting house price growth with differences in land scarcity across different 
US Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). They show that for every dollar in 
house price appreciation home owners extract an extra 25 cents in home equity.  
These three papers jointly draw a picture in which the US subprime bubble has 
mainly been triggered by an increase in the supply of mortgage lending. This in 
turn was caused by lenders’ increased ability to rate and securitize their 
mortgages, as well as by a huge inflow of capital into the US. Once this increase 
in mortgage lending had caused house prices to increase, the ability to borrow 
against these higher values then further accelerated mortgage growth.
6
 Whether 
the “second-round borrowing” effect of house prices on borrowing operated 
mainly by making borrowers more confident to borrow or by making lenders 
more confident to lend is something we do not know. However, the US subprime 
bubble emerged from the interplay of factors that to a significant extent seem 
specific to the recent US context, in particular the huge-scale securitization. It is 
therefore interesting to widen the focus from that specific boom and analyze 
another in which there is little securitization and little foreign bank refinancing. 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our main data stem from Comparis, a Swiss online company that intermediates 
mortgages. Households apply online for a mortgage and then simultaneously 
receive  several offers from different participating lenders. Since households pay 
CHF 148 (about USD 160) to submit a mortgage request and banks adjust their 
offer or rejection according to the comprehensive set of submitted information, 
we can be confident that households will give accurate and verifiable information. 
 
6
  By contrast Justiniano, Primiceri snd Tambalotti 2013, using a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model, 
argue that the US boom is more likely to have been caused by factors that impacted house prices directly and then affected 
mortgage lending through the collateral channel. 
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For applicants, paying the fee means to save the time to personally inquire with 
each of the banks individually. Furthermore, lenders know that applicants 
simultaneously receive offers from many different lenders, so lenders have an 
incentive to make a competitive offer. For the purpose of our research, the 
Comparis data have a number of advantages. First, we observe for each mortgage 
request many details on both demand and supply. On the demand side these 
include the characteristics of the requested mortgage, details of the house to be 
financed, as well as of the financial situation of the applying household. On the 
supply side, we observe which banks respond with an offer and which rates they 
offer. Second, observing many offers for the same request allows us to distinguish 
between the causal effects of house prices on mortgage demand and those on 
mortgage supply. Third, we observe exactly  the same set of details about both the 
applying household (including age, income, wealth, liquid wealth, debt, and 
existing real estate holdings) and the real estate object to be financed (including 
postcode, age, type and market price) as potential lenders do receive. Since 
customers apply anonymously online rather than by visiting lenders’ local 
branches, banks have no further, private information.
7
 
 
For the purpose of instrumenting house prices, we combine our micro level data 
with information on immigration into each of Switzerland’s 106 statistical (“MS”) 
areas defined by the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics (Bundesamt für Statistik, 
BfS). MS areas offer a finer grid than the 26 cantons (states) or the 16 labor 
market regions (also defined by the BfS). From the Statistics Office we have 
obtained information on the total population, as well as on immigration for each 
 
7
 For an example on how soft information matters in branch based consumer lending, see Puri, Rocholl and Steffen 
(2012). More specifically on the role of the breadth of the banking relationship on mortgage lending in Switzerland, see 
Brown and Hoffmann (2013). 
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calendar year and each MS area.
8
 As explained in the empirical strategy section, 
we need information not only on the total number of immigrants, but also on 
immigrants’ countries of origin. A matching key between MS areas and zip codes 
allows us to merge that immigration information to our main dataset. 
 
Table 2 presents a first overview of our sample composition in terms of the 
years covered (Panel A), the mortgage model requested (Panel B) and the type of 
object to be financed (Panel C). It shows that our sample stretches from January 
2008 until October 2013. As Comparis was one of the first websites to offer the 
service of obtaining mortgage offers from multiple banks at the same time, the 
sample is particularly large in the first years of our sample period. Panel (B) 
shows that a bit over 80% of applicants ask for a fixed rate model, most of them 
with a duration of either 5 or 10 years. About 5% have their rate pegged to the 
Libor rate for a predetermined period, and another 5% choose a model in which 
the bank may change the rate at its discretion, but where in return the household 
may at any time move from the variable to a fixed-rate contract without 
punishment. With a view to the types of object to be financed, Panel (C) shows 
that the single largest groups are single-family homes (39%), apartments (28%), 
semi-detached houses (10%) and town houses (9%). Table 7 in the Online 
Appendix, shows that the sample covers all of Switzerland’s 106 MS areas, 
although its density is of course a bit higher in the more populated areas. Beyond 
the distributions covered by those two tables, it is also worth mentioning that on 
the supply side the sample represents almost all types of mortgage lenders. These 
include cantonal, regional and savings banks, banks owned by retail chains, 
foreign banks and insurance companies. Merely Switzerland’s two big banks are 
not included in the sample. 
 
8
 For years 1995-2010 these stem from the “PETRA” database, afterwards from the “STATPOP” database. 
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Table 2 then provides the more detailed summary statistics, starting in Panel 
(A) with the key figures on the mortgage requests. We see that the mean mortgage 
amount requested was about CHF 587,000 and the mean house price to be 
financed about CHF 940,000. The loan-to-value (LTV) ratio amounted on 
average to 65% and the . Another common indicator of a mortgage’s riskiness is 
the payment to income (PTI) ratio, the percentage of regular annual income that a 
household would have to spend on debt service for the suggested object, given a 
conservatively chosen interest rate. Comparis computes this for the participating 
lenders by assuming 5% of the mortgage amount for interest payments, 1% of the 
mortgage amount for amortization to be paid only by those borrowers with a 
starting LTV in excess of two-thirds, and 1% of the house price paid for 
maintenance. Setting these payments in relation to regular annual income yields a 
PTI ratio with a mean of about 26%. This mean lies somewhat below the 33% 
rule-of-thumb threshold above which the PTI would typically be deemed 
problematic, but about 23% of requests have PTI ratios at or above that threshold 
(not shown in the table). 
 
About 52% of the requests concern a new mortgage. The rest are for refinancing 
a mortgage taken out in the past. This occurs because Swiss mortgage contracts 
typically envisage a period of several years during which neither side can leave 
the contract without incurring an additional fee. In fixed rate contracts this 
corresponds to the period for which the interest rate is fixed. At the end of that 
period however, households may shop around to see if another lender offers a 
better deal. The average amount requested for refinancing deals (not displayed 
separately) was about CHF 509,000. That new amount for refinancing requests 
was higher than the initial mortgage in 12% of cases, lower in another 12%, and 
identical in the remainder of cases. The differences between new and refinancing 
mortgages are investigated and discussed further in the results section. 
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Panel (B) features further information on the applying households. It shows that 
average household income is around CHF 167,000 p.a. and average liquid wealth 
lies slightly above one year’s income, at CHF 169,000. Close to 20% of 
households hold some form of other debt and about 28% already own some other 
real estate. The mean value of households’ total wealth including pension wealth 
is about CHF 512,000 and the average age is about 46. The average age of the 
houses is 2.5 decades, but half of the objects are 10 or fewer years old. Panel (C) 
covers immigration. It shows that both actual annual immigration and different 
variants of the instrument explained in more detail in the empirical strategy 
section amounted on average to between 1.33% and 1.36% of the previous year’s 
resident population. In all cases we are forced to use gross rather than net 
migration, because data on the outflow of foreigners mix true outflows with 
naturalizations. Furthermore, note that the panel on immigration reflects the 
distribution across our 12’753 mortgage requests, as they enter our estimations, 
and not an equal or exactly population weighted average across all 106 MS areas. 
Panel (D) finally looks at the supply side. It tells us that the average applicant in 
our sample receives 5.4 different offers. The best interest rate offered across all 
models did on average amount to 2.31% and the median one to 2.54%.  
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
Estimations of the causal effect of house prices on mortgage demand and supply 
may suffer from reverse causality as increases in mortgage volumes are likely to 
in turn affect house prices. We exploit house price shocks exogenous to the 
mortgage market by using variation in the exogenous component of immigration, 
within cantons or labor market regions and within a given year and month. In the 
following, we explain in several steps what we mean by the exogenous 
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component of immigration and which crucial role our set of fixed effects and 
further controls at the applicant level play. 
4.1 The Role of Total Immigration for House Prices and Mortgage Market 
At first sight, immigration by area and period may seem to already constitute a 
decent instrument for house prices
9
: While there is likely to be reverse causality 
from mortgage volumes to house prices, mortgage lending would seem less likely 
to directly affect immigration and thus cause reverse causality problems of its 
own. This is particularly true for Switzerland, where various studies show that 
immigrants themselves typically do not buy real estate and especially not in the 
year of arrival. Rather, immigrants affect house prices only indirectly: They may 
push up rents in the short-run and thus motivate more residents to buy a house. 
 
A study by the Swiss federal agency for housing, Bundesamt für 
Wohnungswesen (2007), underlines this: Using data from the Swiss Labor Force 
Survey SAKE, the authors find that as of 2006 on average 51% of Swiss citizens 
live in their own home, but only 10% of new immigrants do (Table 22, page 70), 
although the ownership share of immigrants does increase somewhat with the 
duration of their stay. A similar picture emerges specifically for the canton of 
Zurich in Rey (2011) and Rey (2012). Besides, the share of immigrants living in 
owner-occupied property is likely even lower in those agglomerations where 
immigration is highest because of shorter average residence times and higher 
house prices relative to incomes. Concerns about reverse causality from the 
mortgage market and more specifically the real estate market on immigration 
flows are diluted further by data on employment showing that despite the house 
 
9
 As Accetturo et al. (2014) show, immigration can affect house prices not only through immigrants’ extra housing 
demand, but also since a higher density of immigrants may affect the attractiveness of housing in an area for natives. For 
our purposes we may remain agnostic about the channels through which immigration affects house prices.  
14 
 
price boom the share of workers employed in construction has remained constant 
over the period under consideration, as has the share of foreigners amongst them. 
This refutes the possible concern that booming housing markets may have 
attracted many construction workers from abroad, as happened for instance during 
the Spanish house price in the early Eurozone years. 
 
 Yet, immigration per se as an instrument for house prices may still suffer from 
omitted variable bias: It is conceivable that in areas or periods with generally high 
economic growth we observe higher immigration (through increased demand for 
labor) and at the same time higher house price and mortgage growth (through 
higher income and wealth growth). Relatedly, areas with currently low house 
prices might simultaneously be more attractive to immigrants and have more 
potential for subsequent house price growth. The vast majority of such omitted 
variable bias is likely to be soaked up by our set of control variables, as we can 
control firstly for region fixed effects (at different levels of granularity as 
discussed in the robustness section), secondly for both year and month effects, 
thirdly for each applicant’s income, wealth, pension wealth and liquid wealth, and 
fourthly for each real estate object’s characteristics. Yet concerns about potential 
endogeneity of immigration may remain, since it is known that immigration flows 
are in general responsive to economic conditions at the destination. 
4.2 The Origin-Push ( Shift-Share) Method to isolate Exogenous  Immigration 
Potential remaining endogeneity of immigration to local economic conditions 
however is an issue that has been extensively addressed by the literature on the 
effects of immigration on respectively employment and house prices. In fact, 
papers in that literature have typically had available only aggregate data by region 
and period and have thus had reasons to be much more concerned about the issue 
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than we do. In response, Card (2001) developed the “shift share” or “origin push” 
methodology to identify the causal effect of immigration on local employment. 
For this purpose, it has also been applied to the Swiss context by Favre et al 
(2013) as well as by Basten and Siegenthaler (2013). The latter have adapted the 
strategy to the Swiss context, in which separate regions are much better connected 
by public transport than different regions of the US, by comparing occupation-age 
cells of the labor market rather than different geographic areas. Hunt and 
Gauthier-Loiselle (2010) use the same empirical strategy to investigate the causal 
effect of immigration on innovation. More importantly for the present paper, Saiz 
(2007), Degen and Fischer (2010), Fischer (2012), Gonzalez and Ortega (2013) 
and Accetturo et al. (2014) have adapted the shift-share strategy for investigating 
the effect of immigration on house prices in respectively the US, Switzerland, 
Spain and Italy. However, to the best of our knowledge this paper is the first to 
exploit a shift-share strategy not for focusing on the causal effect of immigration 
itself, but in turn as an instrument for house prices in investigating their effect on 
the mortgage market. 
 
Intuitively, the idea of the Shift Share strategy is to exploit only that part of the 
variation in immigration which can be explained by “push” factors in immigrants’ 
countries of origin, as opposed to potential “pull factors” operating in the areas of 
destination — hence the name “Origin Push Immigration” (OPI). Therefore it 
focuses on the year-on-year shifts both in the total number of immigrants coming 
into any area of Switzerland and in their composition in terms of countries of 
origin. To obtain different treatment intensities for the 106 different MS areas, the 
total number of immigrants is then distributed to the 106 areas not according to 
their actual present-year flows (which may be partly endogenous) but, for each 
country of origin, according to the shares with which they were distributed in a 
historical year in the past. This exploits the finding that, on top of taking into 
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account local economic opportunities (variation which we thus do not exploit), 
immigrants do also have a tendency to move to areas where their compatriots in 
earlier waves of immigration have already settled, as found by Bartel (1989). 
Thus the methodology is also known as “shift share” or “Bartel” instrument. In 
the following we first give a concrete numerical example and then a more formal 
illustration of how exactly the instrument is computed. 
4.3 A Numerical Example 
To illustrate the functioning of the instrument, Table 3gives an example 
involving the two characteristic immigrant groups from respectively Germany and 
ex-Yugoslavia
10
, the MS areas Zurich and Geneva, and the years 1995 (our 
earliest baseline year) and 2008 (the earliest year of our Comparis sample). Panel 
(A) shows the necessary raw data, Panel (B) the resulting values for the 
endogenous regressor actual immigration and the instrument origin-push 
immigration, both in capita terms. Panel (C) shows the resulting values scaled by 
an area’s previous year’s population levels. We show this in Column (1) for 
immigrants from Germany, in Column (2) for those from Ex-Yugoslavia, and in 
Column (3) we show the corresponding raw data values for all origins combined. 
Looking at Panel (A), we see that in 1995 Switzerland experienced gross 
immigration of 8,215 from Germany and of 20,169 from ex-Yugoslavia, where 
the latter was largely driven by the Yugoslav Wars acting as push-factor. Total 
gross immigration into Switzerland in 1995 amounted to 83,456 individuals. By 
2008 the legacy of the Yugoslav Wars had largely receded and so Switzerland 
saw far fewer immigrants from ex-Yugoslavian countries. By contrast, labor 
market slack at home now motivated many Germans to move to Switzerland. 
 
10
 Since the country definitions have changed over the years and immigrant numbers for many individual countries are 
small, we have included all countries on the territory of former Yugoslavia in a single origin group. 
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Furthermore, immigration of Germans (and, for that matter, any EU citizen) had 
been facilitated relative to 1995 by the Free Movement of Persons (FMP) Treaty 
concluded between Switzerland and the EU and implemented in 2002, as 
discussed in Basten and Siegenthaler (2013). So between 1995 and 2008, the 
numbers of immigrants from these two origins changed in opposite directions, 
with now only 7,739 gross immigrants coming from Ex-Yugoslavia but 34,270 
from Germany. At that time, total gross immigration into Switzerland amounted 
to 125,937 individuals. This example shows that not only did total immigration 
into Switzerland fluctuate widely over the years, but so did the composition of 
immigrants’ countries of origin. The FMP Treaty is one of the major factors 
contributing to that change in origin nationalities. Given the different destination 
area preferences of different origin nationalities, this shift translated also into a 
change in destinations exogenous to our MS area comparisons. The FMP Treaty 
thus additionally strengthens our setup relative to a Shift Share setup without such 
structural breaks. 
The destinations of a given nationality of immigrants did also change over the 
years: While in 1995 close to 6% of German immigrants into Switzerland opted 
for Geneva, in 2008 only slightly more than 2% did. By contrast, only 2.62% of 
immigrants from Ex-Yugoslavia went to Geneva in 1995, but 8.61% did in 2008. 
These changes in destinations could at least partly be due to a destination area’s 
economic prospects: While immigrants from Ex-Yugoslavia in 1995 were mostly 
war refugees distributed across Switzerland by the Swiss government, in 2008 
they were more likely to choose their destination according to where they 
expected the best economic prospects for them. In order to avoid this possible 
source of endogeneity, the shift-share instrument distributes them as if 1995 
shares were still applicable, thus exploiting the fact that to the extent to which 
immigrants do not go by economic prospects, they may go to where they happen 
18 
 
to already know someone, are more likely to find shops and clubs corresponding 
to their preferences, etc. 
Looking at Panel (B), our instrument thus says that in 2008, based on 2008 totals 
but 1995 shares, 0.1422*34,270 = 4,873 Germans and 0.0628*7,739=486 
immigrants from Ex-Yugoslavia move to Zurich. Likewise, the instrument tells us 
that respectively 1,984 Germans and 203 immigrants from Ex-Yugoslavia move 
to Geneva in 2008. Actual immigrant numbers for Zurich (Geneva) in 2008 were 
respectively 4,496 (764) Germans and 413 (666) from Ex-Yugoslavia. As the 
table shows, the OP Immigration we use as instrument is sometimes higher, 
sometimes lower than the actual number of immigrants for that MS area and year. 
This can also be seen when we look at the scaled values in Panel (C). Given these 
predictions for each year, MS area and nationality, we then sum up within each 
year and MS area but across nationalities, so as to obtain a single instrument value 
for each year and area. While for our baseline we compute instrument values 
using the shares from 1995, the earliest year available, robustness checks use 
2008 as first sample year and 2000 as an intermediate year. 
4.4 Formal Computation of our Instrument 
More formally, OP immigration from origin country o into destination area d in 
year t is computed as follows: 
(1)                                     
where zo,Switzerland,t is the total inflow of origin o immigrants into Switzerland in 
year t and α is the share of origin o immigrants from 1995 who went to 
destination area d in 1995. 
 
We compute this for each origin o, then sum up over all countries of origin: 
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(2)      ∑     
 
 
4.5 Advantage: Variation within state or labor market and request level controls 
An important advantage of our micro data setup is that, in contrast to previous 
work using the shift-share instrument, we have enough observations to include not 
only year (and month) fixed effects, but also fixed effects for the 26 Swiss 
cantons (states). As a result, we are able to focus on variation in immigrant flows 
and resulting house prices between the 106 different neighborhoods (MS areas), 
but always within a given canton. This is advantageous because the limited size of 
most cantons as well as Switzerland’s excellent public transport make it possible 
to commute to a job from any MS area in the canton. So even if some cross-
sectional differences in labor market prospects (or tax regimes or other factors) 
are firstly correlated with the number and composition of immigrant inflows and 
are secondly persistent from 1995 until our sample period, then our canton fixed 
effects can control for this. They allow us to focus on where within a given canton 
immigrants choose to live. Put differently: Labor market prospects make 
immigrants move to a different canton, economic factors like rents (not exploited) 
and the residence patterns of compatriots (exploited) tell them where within a 
canton or labor market area to reside. In the robustness section we discuss the 
consequences of this within-canton focus further and introduce also some 
variants, including one in which we replace our fixed effects for the 26 cantons 
with fixed effects for 16 labor market regions defined by the Statistics Office. 
 
The same set of fixed effects also addresses the concern that immigrants from a 
given source country may have a tendency to enter particular labor market sectors 
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(e.g. Germans may be likely to enter engineering sectors) and hence be more 
likely to move to cantons that have a lot of jobs in that sector. Because we focus 
on variation between different neighborhoods within the same canton or labor 
market, differences in the sectoral compositions of different cantons or labor 
markets do not influence our estimates. In addition, note that the sectoral 
composition of each nationality group is by no means stable. Thus Credit Suisse 
Global Research (2013) shows that while in 2009 the group of immigrants from 
Portugal, Spain and Italy working in catering and repair services was more than 
50% larger than that working in financial services, only 3 years later the largest 
group was working in financial services.
11
 
Furthermore, the literature cited above shows that immigration affects not only 
house prices but also inter alia employment and incomes. With a view to the 
exclusion restriction for our instrument, it is important to note that these effects 
can be expected to operate at the canton or labor market level, whereas we find 
the effect of house prices to operate at the more granular MS area level. Therefore 
it is advantageous that, in contrast to most earlier papers using the instrumental-
variable strategy, we can focus on variation across MS areas but within cantons 
(states) or contiguous labor markets. 
Finally, it is also important that we can control for all the applicant and object 
level details that banks consider relevant when granting mortgages. In particular, 
several of the studies cited above have shown that immigration may not only 
affect house prices but may also affect the labor market and hence earnings 
prospects of natives. On the one hand our setup takes care of this by comparing 
only different areas within the same labor market region. On the other hand, our 
controls for several measures of applicants’ income and wealth ensure that we are 
 
11
 They also show large year-on-year changes in the national composition of immigration: Their Graph 5 shows that net 
immigration from Germany was below 10,000 in 2002, above 30,000 in 2007 and 2008, and again below 10,000 by 2012. 
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not capturing changes in mortgage demand and supply caused by changes in 
incomes that in turn have been triggered by immigration. 
 
4.6 Estimating Equations 
Overall, given our instrument and control variables explained above, we first 
estimate for mortgage requests i submitted in MS area d in year t the following 
first stage equation:  
(3)                                                 
 
Beyond the instrument      explained above, this includes time (year and 
month) fixed effects   , canton (or, in a variant labor market region) fixed effects 
  , as well as a long list of control variables capturing the characteristics of the 
object to be financed and the household applying for a mortgage,          . 
Given the instrumented values of the log house price obtained through these first 
stage estimations, we then estimate a set of second stage equations of the 
following form: 
(4)                            ̂                             
 
We use four different outcome variables: As a measure of mortgage demand we 
use the log of the requested mortgage amount, and as measures of mortgage 
supply we use respectively the number of offers a request attracts
12
, the best 
interest rate offered in response to a request, and the median interest rate offered 
in response to that request. 
 
12
 For that outcome measure it is also important to have the canton fixed effects, since the number of banks potentially 
making offers does differ across cantons (some cantonal banks offer only in specific cantons), but not within a canton. 
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4.7 Immigrants as House Buyers? 
Above we have demonstrated how our setup allows us exploit only that part of 
the variation in immigration and thereby in house prices which has not been 
reversely caused by the demand for, or supply of mortgages. Another question 
however is whether (the exogenous component of) immigration could affect 
mortgage demand or supply through a channel other than house prices, namely 
with immigrants themselves showing up as mortgage applicants. In general this 
seems of limited concern since we know from the studies cited above that in 
Switzerland immigrants rarely buy real estate themselves, or at least not right in 
their year of arrival in which they induce variation in our instrument: Since many 
immigrants are not sure initially how long they will stay for, whether and when 
their family follows them, and how the new market works, they will typically first 
rent. This influx into the market for rental housing may however bid up rents and 
thereby motivate more long-time residents to consider switching to owner-
occupied housing. As an additional factor to ensure that our results are not driven 
by increasing the numbers of immigrants applying for mortgages, it is helpful that 
we are able to observe and control for all the same household finance 
characteristics that lenders are able to observe. In particular, banks do not know 
whether a given applicant is himself an immigrant. They can therefore not price 
mortgages based on how they expect different immigrant groups to perform as 
borrowers. What banks do observe is applicants’ income, total wealth, liquid 
wealth and pension wealth, all of which may have been influenced by 
characteristics correlated with the applicant’s potential immigrant status and 
nationality. Exploiting the comprehensive information and multiple dimensions of 
our micro data, we are able to control for all of these characteristics. 
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5 Results 
5.1 Main Results 
Table 4 presents our main results. Column (1) shows our estimates of the first-
stage relationship between origin push immigration and house prices, which is 
common to all instrumental-variable results displayed in the following columns. 
Column (2) shows the second-stage relationship for the effect of house prices on 
mortgage demand, and Columns (3)-(5) show the effect of house prices on 
different measures of mortgage supply. All columns use the same comprehensive 
set of covariates, which we describe in more detail below. As expected, the 1
st
 
stage relationship is positive. It is statistically significant far above the 1% 
threshold. The F statistic for the hypothesis of a jointly zero effect of all 
instruments, in this special case just origin-push immigration, on house prices 
amounts to 216.79. It does thus by far exceed all relevant Stock and Yogo (2005) 
critical values and we can confidently reject the null of weak instruments.  
  
Thanks to our large sample size and good data quality, we obtain similarly high 
statistical precision when estimating our second stage relationships. The estimates 
obtained there tell us that a 1% higher house price causes the household to request 
a 0.52% higher mortgage amount. This reflects the fact that, largely for tax 
reasons, Swiss households do typically not fully exhaust their own savings before 
asking for a mortgage. Hence they still have reserves of their own and so do not 
need the bank to fully finance the price increase. If households had to finance the 
entire amount through mortgage funding, the marginal effect would have had to 
be closer to unity. Yet there is indeed a strong causal effect of house prices on 
mortgage demand. 
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We now turn to the results on mortgage supply. Interestingly the higher house 
prices are not found to increase banks’ willingness to lend, so the collateral 
channel behind Hypothesis 2 above and described inter alia in IMF (2011) does 
not seem to operate here. By contrast, Column (3) shows that conditional on our 
set of object, household, location and time controls, each percent increase of the 
house price does reduce the number of offers by 0.009. Furthermore, conditional 
on making an offer, the lenders in our sample charge higher risk premiums for a 
higher house price: Thus Columns (3)-(5) show that each percent increase in the 
house price raises the best interest rate offered by 0.0015 percentage points (or 
0.15 basis points), and raises the median interest rate offered by 0.0018 
percentage points (0.175 basis points). 
 
We now turn to the effect of control variables on house prices, mortgage supply 
and mortgage demand. Indeed, the risk-adjusted pricing is also reflected in the 
coefficients estimated on the control variables: While a higher income is ceteris 
paribus associated with a higher house price and a higher mortgage amount, 
lenders respond to higher incomes with on average more offers and more 
advantageous interest rates. The same positive supply responses can be observed 
for wealth and, for the number of offers, also for liquidity. By contrast, having 
other financial obligations (which increases the requested mortgage amount) or 
other real estate (which decreases it) both reduce the number of offers. So does, 
ceteris paribus, the age of the house: Requests with older houses receive, 
conditional on the house price and location, fewer offers and are charged higher 
interest rates. These relationships observed for our set of control variables confirm 
that banks do make use of this information, rather than just submitting uniform 
offers. As the coefficient estimates on the control variables feature reasonable 
signs and sizes, these results also support our regression specifications. 
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5.2 Evidence on the Reverse Causality from Mortgage Lending to House Prices 
It is also interesting to compare the instrumental variable estimates to the results 
we would have obtained with Ordinary Least Squares estimations, i.e. without 
isolating the causal effect of house prices. Table 5 displays these OLS results and 
shows that the mortgage demand estimates biased by reverse causality are about 
50% larger. With respect to mortgage supply, they are biased toward less careful 
mortgage lending, with a smaller negative effect on the number of offers and a 
negative rather than positive effect of the house price on interest rates. Both 
findings suggest that the reversely causal effect of mortgage volumes on house 
prices is indeed strongly positive. Overall then, we have evidence of a two-way 
causality between house prices and mortgage volumes in Switzerland. 
 
5.3 Changes over Time 
To gain a deeper understanding of the effects of house prices on mortgage 
demand and supply, we now look at how both have changed as the joint real 
estate and mortgage volume boom has progressed. To do so, we have interacted 
our main explanatory variable of interest, the log house price, with an indicator 
for the 2nd half of our sample, 2011-13. For this reason, we now have to deal with 
two endogenous regressors: the house price in the first half of our sample and the 
house price in the second half (i.e. the house price times the period 2 indicator), 
and they are instrumented by respectively origin-push immigration in the first half 
and origin-push immigration in the second half (i.e. origin-push immigration 
times the period 2 indicator). This procedure of interacting both the excluded 
instrument and the endogenous regressor with an exogenous sample split indicator 
to test for subsample differences is one we shall use several times below.  For a 
more detailed explanation, see for instance Ozer-Balli and Sorensen (2010). 
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Table 6 provides the results on the sample split by period. Columns (1) and (2) 
show both first-stage regressions, which again feed into all second-stage 
estimations in the following columns. Column (3) shows the effect of the house 
price on mortgage demand and Columns (4)-(6) show that on mortgage supply. 
The interaction term in Line 4 shows how the marginal effect of house prices on 
these different outcomes in the second period differs from that in the first. 
Findings on this issue are two-fold. Firstly we find that the marginal effect of the 
house price on mortgage demand is much stronger in the second than in the first 
period. This might reflect the fact that in the course of the boom houses have 
already become more expensive, while wealth has not increased as much, so 
households must rely more heavily on external finance. It may also reflect the fact 
that potentially the fraction of “marginal households”, whose savings are low in 
relation to the envisaged house price, may have increased. Lenders respond to 
these changes in house prices by making significantly fewer offers, whereas the 
inter-period difference in pricing behavior is not statistically significant. 
 
5.4 The Effect of House Prices for Low- vs. High-LTV and PTI requests 
Another way to deepen our understanding of how mortgage demand and supply 
respond to higher house prices is to analyze this separately for low and high LTV 
ratios, and for low and high PTI ratios. In contrast to the sample split by period, 
the indicator for high vs. low LTV is endogenous to mortgage demand: The 
higher the mortgage amount requested, the more likely the request is to be in the 
high-LTV and high-PTI subsamples. But the interaction procedure explained in 
the previous subsection is only valid if the interaction variable is exogenous, for 
otherwise interacting it with the instrument does not yield a valid second 
instrument. Therefore we cannot validly test for subsample differences in the 
effect of house prices on mortgage demand here. 
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By contrast we may validly test for differences in the effect on mortgage 
supply. This is based on the reasoning that in our setup LTV and PTI are not 
reversely caused by the request-specific mortgage supply (average mortgage 
supply is being controlled for by our year, month and canton fixed effects), 
because offers are made only after requests have been submitted. Our robustness 
checks based on a Simultaneous Equations Model (SEM) below confirm that this 
reasoning is indeed plausible. 
 
 Table 7 and Table 8 describe the results of the interactions with respectively 
LTV and PTI indicators. Like in the table on the first vs. the second half of the 
sample, we interact both our endogenous regressor and our instrument with an 
indicator, now for respectively LTV ratios above 67% and for PTI ratios above 
33%. These are commonly deemed relevant thresholds in the Swiss market and 
are also mentioned as such to applicants on the Comparis website. Traditionally, 
Swiss banks have required households to amortize the portion with an LTV above 
67% and since 2012 they are required by regulation to do so. For banks there are 
also changes in regulatory risk weights at the 67% threshold as well as at the 80% 
threshold. Given the second discontinuity at the 80% LTV as well as some 
outliers above that level, we focus in  Table 7 on observations with LTVs below 
80%. Table 7 shows that in the case of more leveraged households banks restrict 
the number of offers in response to high house prices more strongly than 
otherwise: The more “skin the bank is to put into the game”, the more it wants to 
be compensated for additional risk. Point estimates also suggest that the interest 
rate response to house prices is higher for high-LTV than for low-LTV 
applications, however that difference is not statistically significant at conventional 
levels. Table 8 by contrast reveals no difference in the supply response of banks 
to house prices between more and less affordable requests. A possible explanation 
for these differences between Tables 7 and 8 is that while highly leveraged 
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households are particularly exposed to price risk, households with high PTI ratios 
are instead more exposed to interest rate and income risk, as explained in Brown 
and Guin (2013). 
 
5.5 Multi-Family Homes as Proxy for Income-Producing Real Estate 
Table 9 interacts our main regressors of interest with an indicator for multi-
family homes (MFH), which can be seen as a proxy for Income-Producing Real 
Estate (IPRE). Given the evidence from other studies that migrants themselves 
tend to rent rather than buy, we would expect a larger 1
st
 stage effect of OP 
immigration on house prices for MFHs. This is confirmed by Columns 1 and 2, 
which show a 1
st
 stage effect of about 9% for non-MFHs but one of about 17% for 
MFHs. Column 3 shows tentative evidence that for MFHs house prices have a 
larger effect on the amount demanded, although that difference is not statistically 
significant. Columns 4-6 show that ceteris paribus high house prices make banks 
less nervous when the object is a MFH. Presumably this is so since for MFHs 
house prices must be assessed in relation to expected rents, which are not being 
observed and controlled for here. 
 
5.6 New Mortgage vs. Refinancing Requests 
Table 10 continues with a distinction between new mortgage and refinancing 
requests, each of which makes up about half of our sample. This is because when 
they first buy a house, Swiss households will typically get a fixed rate or Libor-
pegged mortgage for a fixed period of mostly up to 10 years. After that time they 
will not have repaid their mortgage but must renegotiate a refinancing deal. In the 
period covered by our sample, mortgage interest rates were typically lower than 5 
or 10 years before and so all such households had an incentive to renegotiate both 
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with their previous bank and with other banks via the Comparis website. Another 
specificity of our sample is that at the time at which households were asking for a 
refinancing mortgage the market value of their house had typically increased a 
good deal above that at which they had concluded their initial mortgage contract. 
In contrast to many other countries however
13
, only about 12% of refinancing 
requests in our sample asked for a higher than the original mortgage amount.
14
 In 
that environment of increasing house prices, these 12% are also more likely 
(66%) to provide an updated house value instead of the original purchase price
15
 
than those asking for the same as the original amount (48%) or those who have 
already repaid part of the mortgage (42%). 
 
In line with this picture in which few households exploit the rising house prices 
to increase their mortgage, Table 10 reveals that for refinancing requests house 
prices have a significantly smaller effect on mortgage demand than for new 
mortgages, as indicated by the negative coefficient on the interaction between the 
house price and the refinancing indicator in Column (3), Line 4. By contrast, the 
role of house prices for the degree of caution banks exert in their mortgage supply 
is if anything smaller for refinancing requests than for new mortgages. This can 
be seen from the fact that the interactions in Columns (5)-(7) carry the opposite 
sign of the main effects, with that for the number of offers also being statistically 
significant. The finding may firstly reflect that with few mortgage amount 
increases most refinancing requests now have a lower leverage relative to current 
house prices than the new mortgage requests. Secondly, refinancing requests have 
already been checked once by the bank financing the new mortgage, so that new 
 
13
 E.g. Mian and Sufi (2011) show that in the US subprime boom leverage was increased by households taking equity 
out of their homes. 
14
 At the same time, only about 12% had reduced the amount, with 76% asking for the same as the original amount, a 
consequence of tax incentives to save into other assets but retain mortgage debt as high as allowed by regulators and banks. 
15
 The website allows for either, but asks households to specify the source of their house value. 
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banks may find fewer remaining shortcomings here than for new mortgage 
requests. 
 
5.7 The Effects for Risk-Seeking vs. Risk-Averse Mortgage Applicants 
It is also interesting to compare the effects of house prices on mortgage demand 
and supply for more with those for less risk-averse applicants. To do so, Table 11 
shows the results for different types of mortgage model: Risk-averse applicants 
can be deemed more likely to choose a model in which the interest rate is fixed. 
As our summary statistics revealed, this applies to 81% of requests. Less risk-
averse applicants may choose models in which the rate is tied to LIBOR interest 
rates or can be adjusted freely by banks in response to changing market 
environments
16
. Another interesting subsample are households applying for 
special mortgages with rate discounts for energy-efficient buildings, discounts for 
children, or initial discounts ("step mortgages"). Since we compare more than two 
categories here, we are not presenting an interaction of the main effect with an 
indicator, as before. Instead we have estimated results separately for different 
subsamples. Panel (A) presents, for reference, the results for our full sample. 
Panel (B) presents results only for fixed-rate mortgages, which with 10,381 of 
12,753 requests presents the large majority of observations. Out of these 10,381 
requests, again the largest groups (not displayed separately) are mortgages with 
rates fixed for either 5 or 10 years, whereas the groups with rates fixed for 1, 2, 3, 
4, 6, 7, 8 or 9 years are smaller. The outcome variables presented in the 5 columns 
are the same as before. In the discussion of these results we focus on the IV 
results. A comparison of the effects of house prices on mortgage demand in 
 
16
 In contrast to LIBOR mortgages, these can typically be terminated without punishment by either side at any time. 
These 5% of contracts are typically chosen by households who bet that interest rates will fall further and who hope to 
switch to a fixed-rate model later. 
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Column (2) between on the one hand fixed rate mortgages (Panel B) and on the 
other hand adjustable rate mortgages (Panel C) shows that for adjustable rate 
mortgages house price increases result in larger mortgage amount increases, 
reflecting a higher leverage and starting PTI of this type of applicant. Column (5) 
also provides some evidence that for that riskier group house prices have a larger 
marginal effect on the median interest rate (although the general interest rate 
level, not displayed, is of course lower for those contracts), suggesting that banks 
do also perceive these clients as on average riskier and take this into account in 
their pricing. An above-average effect of on mortgage demand is also found for 
special rate mortgages. 
6 Robustness 
Our Online Appendix explores in detail the robustness of our results. Here we 
provide a brief summary of these robustness checks, while encouraging the reader 
to take a view at the more detailed discussions and tables in the Online Appendix. 
The first section there augments our baseline instrumental variable model, in 
which we use an excluded instrument only for house prices, with a more general 
simultaneous equations model that has an “excluded instrument” also for 
mortgage demand. This allows us to control for direct effects of mortgage demand 
on mortgage supply. Doing so does not significantly change the estimated effects 
of house prices on respectively mortgage demand and mortgage supply. 
 
We also explore the role of different sets of fixed effects. We find that time 
fixed effects do not matter much for the mortgage demand equations, but do 
matter for mortgage supply, because they control for changes over time in the 
general level of interest rates. Omitting canton fixed effects does, expectedly, lead 
to larger estimates. This likely reflects that these canton fixed effects do 
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successfully absorb remaining cross-sectional differences in price levels. By 
contrast, whether we do this by means of canton or labor market fixed effects 
does not matter. Mortgage model fixed effects leave our point estimates largely 
unchanged, but increase statistical precision in our interest rate regressions. 
In further robustness checks, we show that results do not change in a significant 
way when we use different historical shares to construct our instrument or when 
exclude the 5 MS areas with the largest inflows of German immigrants. We also 
show that the effects are not driven by the cantons of Zurich and Geneva, but are 
in fact weaker there. In particular, banks respond less cautiously to high house 
prices in Zurich and Geneva than elsewhere, presumably because despite the 
higher levels they consider prices more justified in these centers than in other 
regions. Finally, the Appendix shows that the statistical significance of our results 
does not hinge on how we cluster our standard errors. 
 
7 Conclusion 
This paper is one of the very few that disentangle the direction of causality 
between housing and mortgage markets, as well as to the best of our knowledge 
the first to do so for a setting other than the recent US subprime bubble. We 
address this two-way causality in a new way: By use of an origin-push or shift-
share strategy, we isolate the exogenous component of immigration into an area. 
Thereby we exploit variation in house prices that has not been reversely caused by 
mortgage lending. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply such a 
strategy to the analysis of mortgage markets. Furthermore, the use of micro 
instead of regional level data, as well as our focus on within-canton, within-year, 
within-month variation, renders this approach even more robust than it has been 
in many existing shift-share papers which had to work with aggregate data only. 
We find that a 1% higher house price causes a 0.52% higher requested mortgage 
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amount. The total, non-causal partial correlation between house prices and 
mortgage volumes is a good deal larger. Causality therefore is not restricted to 
one direction, but does flow in both ways. 
 
At the same time, we are able to trace out separate causal effects of house prices 
on respectively mortgage demand and mortgage supply. We find strong evidence 
that the higher house prices have specifically led to an expansion of mortgage 
demand. Interestingly, our results do not support the hypothesis that higher house 
prices and therefore more valuable collateral cause banks to lend more or at lower 
rates. To the contrary, we find that higher house prices attract ceteris paribus 
fewer mortgage offers and higher mortgage interest rates. This result emphasizes 
the importance of the demand channel even more. However, it has been obtained 
by comparing requests with more and less expensive houses submitted in the 
same low-interest rate environment. So while we find lenders to be careful about 
high house prices, that does not rule out that in the market as a whole the low 
interest rates of recent years have also caused an expansion of mortgage supply. 
 
We also demonstrate how the mutually reinforcing real estate and mortgage 
market booms have evolved and how the marginal effect of house prices on 
respectively mortgage demand (positive) and mortgage supply (negative) has 
become stronger over time. We show that the positive effect of house prices on 
mortgage pricing is particularly strong for high LTV applications, but does not 
vary with PTI ratios. Both demand and supply effects are smaller for rollovers 
than for new mortgage requests. Finally, the cautious response of lenders to high 
house prices is less pronounced in the “prime locations” Zurich and Geneva than 
elsewhere. 
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Our findings have important policy implications. First, we have shown that part 
of the house price boom has occurred for reasons exogenous to the mortgage 
market, although there is indeed also positive feedback from mortgage volumes to 
house prices. This implies that from the policy side, house prices can be 
influenced through mortgage market measures, but the influence is limited. If 
policy makers wish to exert a strong impact also on house prices, they may need 
to intervene also directly in the real estate market. Measures to be considered here 
may include changes to building permit restrictions, to the supply of public 
transport as an influence on which areas are well connected to jobs, subsidies for 
social housing, or affecting competition in the construction sector. Second, our 
finding that house prices have exerted a greater positive effect on mortgage 
demand than on mortgage supply supports the usefulness of measures targeting 
mortgage demand in order to affect the quantity and quality of mortgage growth. 
Kuttner and Shim (2013) have shown that changes to tax incentives have a 
particularly high probability of success here, but restrictions on LTV or PTI 
ratios, which can limit the maximum mortgage amount a household can request 
for a given level of savings or income, may also help. 
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I. Figures 
Figure 1: Swiss house prices and mortgage volume: Nominal growth rates per annum 
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Figure 2: Three different causal relationships between house prices and mortgage volumes 
 
 
40 
 
II. Tables 
Table 1: Sample Composition 
 
Observations Percentage of the Sample
(A) By Year
2008 2'599 20.38%
2009 2'808 22.02%
2010 2'587 20.29%
2011 1'627 12.76%
2012 1'746 13.69%
2013 (Jan-Oct) 1'386 10.87%
(B) By Model
Rate Fixed for 1 Year 36 0.28%
Rate Fixed for 2 Years 194 1.52%
Rate Fixed for 3 Years 582 4.56%
Rate Fixed for 4 Years 179 1.40%
Rate Fixed for 5 Years 3'332 26.13%
Rate Fixed for 6 Years 282 2.21%
Rate Fixed for 7 Years 494 3.87%
Rate Fixed for 8 Years 663 5.20%
Rate Fixed for 9 Years 59 0.46%
Rate Fixed for 10 Years 4'562 35.77%
Variable Rate 641 5.03%
Rate Libor-pegged for 3 Years 553 4.34%
Rate Libor-pegged for 5 Years 186 1.46%
Combined mortgage for <5 Years 145 1.14%
Combined mortgage for >=5 Years 79 0.62%
Special mortgage 766 6.01%
(C) By Object type
Penthouse 356 2.79%
Semi-Detached House 1'232 9.66%
Apartment 3'565 27.95%
Single Family Home 4'957 38.87%
Multi Family Home 977 7.66%
Town/Row/Terraced House 1'141 8.95%
Terrace House 206 1.62%
Mansion/Bungalow 319 2.50%
Special  models include those with interest rate discounts for respectively energy-efficient buildings and 
large families, as well  as "step" mortgages with lower initial rates.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
Observations Mean Std. Dev. P10 P50 P90
(A) Key request figures
Requested Mortgage Amount (CHF) 12'753 586'933 348'282 250'000 500'000 1'000'000
House Price (CHF) 12'753 939'855 571'636 455'000 795'000 1'600'000
Loan-to-Value ratio (LTV ratio) 12'753 64.79 16.83 39 69 80
Price-to-Income (PTI ratio) 12'753 26.33 10.39 14 26 37
Request for a new Mortgage in % (Indicator) 12'753 52.31%
Amount of the Previous Mortgage (for roll-overs) 6'082 527'104 450'614 227'000 449'540 830'700
(B) Key applicant and object figures
Household Income (CHF p.a.) 12'753 167'256 91'417 85'000 146'000 270'000
Household Liquidity (CHF) 12'753 168'997 216'317 16'500 100'000 400'000
Household Debt in % (Indicator) 12'753 19.96 39.97 0 0 1
Household owns real estate in % (Indicator) 12'753 27.57 44.69 0 0 1
HH wealth incl retirement savings 12'753 511'768 924'411 95'000 315'000 1'022'000
Applicant age 12'753 46.05 10.23 34 45 61
House age in decades 12'753 2.49 3.57 0 1 7
(C) Immigration into MS Areas
Origin Push Immigration / Population (1995 shares) 12'753 1.33% 0.82% 0.67% 1.07% 2.72%
Origin Push Immigration / Population (2000 shares) 12'753 1.34% 0.83% 0.60% 1.07% 2.61%
Origin Push Immigration / Population (2008 shares) 12'753 1.36% 0.87% 0.58% 1.08% 2.62%
Actual Immigration / Population 12'753 1.36% 0.85% 0.59% 1.07% 2.71%
(D) Offers
Offers per Request 12'753 5.41 2.55 2 5 9
Best Interest Rate Offered 12'753 2.31 0.76 1.25 2.25 3.35
Median Interest Rate Offered 12'753 2.54 0.76 1.56 2.49 3.57
Notes: Best and median interest rate: Amount-weighted average across tranches.
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Table 3: Numerical Example to illustrate the Functioning of the Instrument 
 
(1) (2) (3)
From From From
Germany Ex Yugoslavia Anywhere
(A) Imm. into Switzerland 1995 8'215 20'169 83'456
   Share in Zurich 1995 14.22% 6.28% 7.90%
   Share in Geneva 1995 5.79% 2.62% 14.34%
Imm. into Switzerland 2008 34'270 7'739 125'937
   Share in Zurich 2008 13.12% 5.34% 8.56%
   Share in Geneva 2008 2.23% 8.61% 14.18%
(B) Actual Immigrants ZH 2008 4'496 413
Origin-Push Imm. ZH 2008 4'873 486
Actual Immigrants GE 2008 764 666
Origin-Push Imm. GE 2008 1'984 203
(C) Actual Imm. /Pop. ZH 2008 1.25% 0.12%
Origin-Push Imm. / Pop. ZH 2008 1.36% 0.14%
Actual Imm. / Pop. GE 2008 0.17% 0.15%
Origin-Push Imm. / Pop. GE 2008 0.45% 0.05%
This  table shows in Panel (A) the raw data, in Panel (B) actual and instrument va lues  for 2008 for 
respectively MS areas Zurich and Geneva. The instrument values, denoted as Origin-Push or Shift-
Share, Immigration are computed according to Equations (1) and (2), see Section 4.5. Panel C) shows 
the corresponding va lues as percentage of previous year's (2007) population levels, which were 
respectively 358'540 and 438'177.
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Table 4: Main Instrumental Variable Results 
 
First Stage Mortgage Demand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln House Ln Mortg. Number Best Median
Price Amount of Offers Int. Rate Int. Rate
Origin Push Immigration 0.093***
(0.007)
Ln House Price (instrumented) 0.523*** -0.972** 0.148** 0.175***
(0.071) (0.414) (0.062) (0.055)
Ln Income 0.311*** 0.249*** 0.853*** -0.087*** -0.068***
(0.026) (0.034) (0.165) (0.022) (0.020)
Ln Wealth 0.067*** -0.021*** 0.230*** -0.036*** -0.036***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.039) (0.006) (0.005)
Ln Liquidity 0.046*** 0.020*** 0.117*** -0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.027) (0.004) (0.004)
Other Fin. Obligations (y/n) 0.010 0.020** -0.357*** 0.006 0.000
(0.010) (0.009) (0.053) (0.008) (0.007)
Other Real Estate (y/n) 0.038*** -0.031*** -0.456*** 0.005 -0.016**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.050) (0.008) (0.007)
House Age (Decades) -0.021*** -0.010*** -0.019* 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant 8.697*** 3.145*** 6.820* 3.340*** 2.988***
(0.266) (0.616) (3.614) (0.543) (0.481)
Canton Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year and month Fixed Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Object Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mortg. Model Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12'753 12'753 12'753 12'753 12'753
R-sq 0.522 0.610 0.282 0.809 0.840
Mortgage Supply
This  table shows  in Column (1) the common 1st stage effect of origin push immigration on the house price. Columns (2)-(3) 
show the 2nd s tage estimates of the causal effect of the house price  on mortgage demand, measured by respectively the 
amount requested and the payment-to-income ratio requested. Columns (4)-(6) show the 2nd stage estimates of the effect 
on mortgage supply, as measured by respectively the number of offers a household receives, the best interest rate offered, 
and the median interest rate offered. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 5: Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Results 
 
Mortgage Demand
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln Mortg. Number Best Median
Amount of Offers Int. Rate Int. Rate
Ln House Price 0.777*** -0.367*** -0.014 -0.019**
(0.013) (0.063) (0.008) (0.008)
Ln Income 0.168*** 0.660*** -0.036*** -0.006
(0.018) (0.084) (0.007) (0.006)
Ln Wealth -0.038*** 0.189*** -0.025*** -0.023***
(0.005) (0.026) (0.004) (0.004)
Ln Liquidity 0.008*** 0.089*** 0.007** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.020) (0.003) (0.003)
Other Fin. Obligations (y/n) 0.018** -0.364*** 0.007 0.002
(0.008) (0.052) (0.008) (0.007)
Other Real Estate (y/n) -0.041*** -0.481*** 0.012* -0.008
(0.007) (0.046) (0.007) (0.006)
House Age (Decades) -0.005*** -0.007 0.002** 0.001
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.949*** 1.585** 4.740*** 4.660***
(0.139) (0.766) (0.107) (0.094)
Year month canton FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Object Type FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mortg. Model FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12'753 12'753 12'753 12'753
R2 0.637 0.289 0.814 0.849
Mortgage Supply
This  table shows  in Column (1) the Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the association between 
house prices and mortgage demand, measured by the amount requested. Columns (2) -(4) show the 
assocations between house prices and mortgage supply, as measured by respectively the number of 
offers a  household receives, the best interest rate offered, and the median interest rate offered. 
Robust s tandard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 6: Years 2008-10 vs. years 2011-13 
 
Mortgage Demand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln House Ln HP* Ln Mortg. Number Best Median
Price I(yr>=2011) Amount of Offers Int. Rate Int. Rate
Origin Push Immigration (OPI) 0.084*** -0.019***
(0.007) (0.004)
OPI*Indicator(year>=2011) 0.024*** 0.134***
(0.009) (0.008)
Ln House Price 0.462*** -0.537 0.161** 0.201***
(0.081) (0.465) (0.072) (0.063)
Ln HP*Indicator(year>=2011) 0.159** -1.130*** -0.035 -0.070
(0.069) (0.353) (0.062) (0.054)
Ln Income 0.311*** 0.122*** 0.249*** 0.856*** -0.087*** -0.068***
(0.026) (0.012) (0.034) (0.166) (0.022) (0.020)
Ln Wealth 0.067*** 0.029*** -0.022*** 0.234*** -0.036*** -0.036***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.039) (0.006) (0.005)
Ln Liquidity 0.045*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.121*** -0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.028) (0.004) (0.004)
Other Fin. Obligations (y/n) 0.010 0.013* 0.019** -0.346*** 0.006 0.001
(0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.053) (0.008) (0.007)
Other Real Estate (y/n) 0.038*** 0.003 -0.029*** -0.468*** 0.005 -0.017**
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.050) (0.008) (0.007)
House Age (Decades) -0.021*** -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.019* 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant 8.709*** -1.949*** 4.001*** 0.756 3.152*** 2.615***
(0.266) (0.131) (0.782) (4.427) (0.699) (0.612)
Canton Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year and month Fixed Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Object Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mortg. Model Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12753 12753 12753 12753 12753 12753
R-sq 0.522 0.998 0.605 0.273 0.808 0.840
Mortgage SupplyFirst Stage
This  table tests whether the effects of interest differ between the 1st and the 2nd half of our sample. It shows in Columns (1) and (2) the 
1st s tage regressions for respectively the house price in 2008-10 and that in 2011-13. Column (3) shows the 2nd stage estimate of the 
effect of the house price on mortgage demand, measured by the amount requested. The effect for 2008-10 i s given by the coefficient in 
Line 3 a lone, that for 2011-13 by adding to that the coefficient from Line 4 (Log HP*Indicator). Hence that coefficient tells ushow the 
effect in 2011-13 di ffered from that before. Columns (4)-(6) show analogously the effects of the two house price variables on mortgage 
supply, measured by respectively the number of offers received, the best and the median interest rate offered. Robust SEs in 
parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 7: High- vs. low-LTV applications 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln House Ln HP* Number Best Median
Price I(LTV>=67) of Offers Int. Rate Int. Rate
Origin Push Immigration (OPI) 0.103*** -0.011**
(0.009) (0.005)
OPI*I(LTV>=67) -0.016* 0.107***
(0.009) (0.008)
Ln House Price -1.177*** 0.172** 0.207***
(0.434) (0.069) (0.062)
Ln HP*I(LTV>=67) -0.989** 0.094 0.040
(0.417) (0.074) (0.066)
I (LTV>=67) -0.086*** 13.436*** 12.877** -1.224 -0.485
(0.014) (0.012) (5.665) (1.008) (0.896)
Ln Income 0.307*** 0.146*** 1.229*** -0.118*** -0.089***
(0.030) (0.015) (0.210) (0.027) (0.023)
Ln Wealth 0.049*** 0.015*** 0.163*** -0.028*** -0.029***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.038) (0.006) (0.005)
Ln Liquidity 0.042*** 0.026*** 0.113*** -0.005 -0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.029) (0.005) (0.004)
Other Fin. Obligations (y/n) 0.025** -0.004 -0.291*** 0.005 -0.004
(0.011) (0.008) (0.062) (0.009) (0.008)
Other Real Estate (y/n) 0.039*** 0.018** -0.511*** 0.005 -0.013*
(0.009) (0.007) (0.054) (0.009) (0.008)
House Age (Decades) -0.020*** -0.010*** -0.028*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 9.044*** -2.117*** 6.549 3.275*** 2.711***
(0.303) (0.152) (4.226) (0.682) (0.613)
Canton Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year and month Fixed Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Object Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mortg. Model Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9994 9994 9994 9994 9994
R-sq 0.519 0.998 0.320 0.810 0.840
Mortgage SupplyFirst Stage
This  table tests whether the effect of house prices differs between high and low LTV requests. It shows  
in Col . 1 and 2 the 1st s tage regressions for respectively the house price in applications with LTV<67% 
and in applications with LTV>=67%. Observations with LTV>80% are dropped. C. 3-5 show the effect of 
the house price on respectively the number of offers received, the best interest rate, and the median 
interest rate. In each case the effect for LTV<67% applications is given by the Line 3 coefficient alone, 
that for LTV>=67% applications by the sum of the coefficients from Lines 3 and 4. Robust standard errors 
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Table 8: High- vs. low-PTI applications 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln House Ln HP* Number Best Median
Price I(PTI>=33) of Offers Int. Rate Int. Rate
Origin Push Immigration (OPI) 0.078*** -0.020***
(0.007) (0.003)
OPI*I(PTI>=33) 0.025*** 0.151***
(0.009) (0.010)
Ln House Price -0.373 0.140* 0.195***
(0.446) (0.072) (0.064)
Ln HP*I(PTI>=33) 0.517 -0.021 -0.042
(0.335) (0.061) (0.055)
Indicator (PTI>=33) 0.269*** 13.648*** -9.038** 0.317 0.544
(0.013) (0.015) (4.598) (0.841) (0.750)
Ln Income 0.365*** 0.113*** 0.268 -0.077*** -0.077***
(0.030) (0.009) (0.170) (0.027) (0.025)
Ln Wealth 0.072*** 0.015*** 0.148*** -0.034*** -0.037***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.039) (0.006) (0.006)
Ln Liquidity 0.036*** 0.006*** 0.144*** -0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.024) (0.004) (0.004)
Other Fin. Obligations (y/n) -0.010 -0.007 -0.232*** 0.003 0.003
(0.010) (0.006) (0.048) (0.008) (0.007)
Other Real Estate (y/n) 0.043*** 0.043*** -0.530*** 0.007 -0.015**
(0.008) (0.005) (0.049) (0.008) (0.007)
House Age (Decades) -0.018*** -0.003*** -0.024*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 7.994*** -1.563*** 6.882* 3.305*** 2.836***
(0.306) (0.096) (3.777) (0.612) (0.549)
Canton Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year and month Fixed Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Object Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mortg. Model Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12753 12753 12753 12753 12753
R-sq 0.578 0.999 0.374 0.810 0.840
First Stage Mortgage Supply
This  table tests whether the effect of house prices differs between high and low PTI ratio requests. It 
shows  in  Col. 1 and 2 the 1st s tage regressions for respectively the house price in applications with 
PTI<33% and in those with PTI>=33%.  C. 3-5 show the effect of the house price on respectively the 
number of offers received, the best and the median interest rate. In each case the effect for PTI<33% is 
given by the Line 3 coefficient a lone, that for PTI>=33% cases by the sum of the coefficients from ll. 3 
and 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 9: Multi-Family Homes vs. other (typically owner-occupied) objects 
 
Mortgage Demand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln House Ln HP* Ln Mortg. Number Best Median
Price I(MFH) Amount of Offers Int. Rate Int. Rate
Origin Push Immigration (OPI) 0.094*** -0.002
(0.007) (0.002)
OPI*Indicator(MFH) -0.008 0.167***
(0.022) (0.024)
Ln House Price 0.515*** -1.147*** 0.155** 0.182***
(0.071) (0.424) (0.063) (0.056)
Ln HP*Indicator(MFH) 0.056 1.278** -0.048 -0.053
(0.128) (0.532) (0.099) (0.086)
Ln Income 0.425*** 13.854*** -0.635 -18.918** 0.687 0.701
(0.035) (0.037) (1.799) (7.454) (1.388) (1.212)
Ln Wealth 0.311*** 0.032*** 0.250*** 0.867*** -0.088*** -0.068***
(0.026) (0.005) (0.034) (0.169) (0.022) (0.020)
Ln Liquidity 0.067*** 0.007*** -0.021*** 0.231*** -0.036*** -0.036***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.039) (0.006) (0.005)
Other Fin. Obligations (y/n) 0.046*** 0.007*** 0.020*** 0.117*** -0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.028) (0.004) (0.004)
Other Real Estate (y/n) 0.010 -0.000 0.020** -0.357*** 0.006 0.000
(0.010) (0.004) (0.009) (0.053) (0.008) (0.007)
House Age (Decades) 0.038*** 0.032*** -0.032*** -0.491*** 0.006 -0.014*
(0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.052) (0.008) (0.007)
Constant -0.021*** -0.005*** -0.010*** -0.016 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001)
Canton Fixed Effects 8.696*** -0.531*** 3.243*** 9.041** 3.257*** 2.897***
(0.266) (0.055) (0.611) (3.728) (0.558) (0.495)
Year and month Fixed Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Object Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mortg. Model Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12753 12753 12753 12753 12753 12753
R-sq 0.522 0.998 0.610 0.274 0.809 0.840
First Stage Mortgage Supply
This  table tests whether the effects of interest differ between  multi-family homes (MFH) and other objects. It shows in Columns (1) 
and (2) the 1st stage regressions for respectively the house price of non-MFH and MFH objects. (3) shows the 2nd stage estimate of 
the effect of the house price on the mortgage amount demanded. The effect for non-MFHs is given by the coefficient in Line 3 a lone, 
that for 2MFHs  by adding to that the coefficient from Li.4 (Log HP*MFH). Hence that coefficient tells us how the effect ior MFHs
di ffers from that for non-MFHs. C. (4)-(6) show analogously the effects of the 2 house price variables on mortgage supply, measured 
by  the number of offers received, the best and the median  rate offered. Robust SEsin parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 10: New Mortgages vs. Refinancing requests 
 
Mortgage Demand
(1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7)
Ln House Ln HP* Ln Mortg. Number Best Median
Price I(Rollover) Amount of Offers Int. Rate Int. Rate
Origin Push Immigration (OPI) 0.096*** -0.011**
(0.008) (0.005)
OPI*Indicator(Rollover) -0.004 0.118***
(0.008) (0.008)
Ln House Price 0.645*** -1.531*** 0.197*** 0.172***
(0.069) (0.446) (0.067) (0.060)
Ln HP*Indicator(Rollover) -0.163** 1.028*** -0.088 0.024
(0.066) (0.351) (0.060) (0.054)
Indicator(Rollover) 0.002 13.438*** 1.979** -13.569*** 1.156 -0.361
(0.013) (0.011) (0.900) (4.773) (0.811) (0.730)
Ln Income 0.311*** 0.119*** 0.225*** 0.915*** -0.093*** -0.071***
(0.026) (0.012) (0.031) (0.169) (0.022) (0.020)
Ln Wealth 0.067*** 0.017*** -0.008 0.218*** -0.035*** -0.033***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.039) (0.006) (0.005)
Ln Liquidity 0.045*** 0.013*** -0.020*** 0.195*** -0.008* -0.006
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.029) (0.004) (0.004)
Other Fin. Obligations (y/n) 0.010 0.022*** 0.010 -0.352*** 0.005 -0.002
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.053) (0.008) (0.007)
Other Real Estate (y/n) 0.038*** 0.033*** -0.015* -0.496*** 0.009 -0.014**
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.050) (0.008) (0.007)
House Age (Decades) -0.021*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.021** 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant 8.702*** -1.636*** 2.194*** 12.746*** 2.833*** 3.120***
(0.269) (0.132) (0.643) (4.160) (0.635) (0.562)
Canton Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year and month Fixed Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Object Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mortg. Model Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12753 12753 12753 12753 12753 12753
R-sq 0.522 0.998 0.657 0.282 0.809 0.840
Mortgage SupplyFirst Stages
This  table tests whether the effect of the house price differs between new mortgages and refinancing requests. It shows  in Columns (1) 
and (2) the 1st stage regressions for respectively the house price for new mortgages and  for the house price in refinancing applications. 
Column (3)  shows the effect of both house price variables on mortgage demand, measured by the amount requested. C. (4)-(6) finally 
show the effects of the two house price variables on mortgage supply, measured by respectively the number of offers received,the best 
interest rate offered, and the median interest rate offered.Robust s tandard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 11: Results by mortgage model 
 
 
First Stage Mortgage Demand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln House Ln Mortg. Number Best Median
Price Amount of Offers Int. Rate Int. Rate
(A) All FS/IV 0.093*** 0.523*** -0.972** 0.148** 0.175***
(N=12'753) (0.007) (0.071) (0.414) (0.062) (0.055)
(B) Fixed Rate FS/IV 0.088*** 0.492*** -1.197** 0.150** 0.123**
(N=10'381) (0.007) (0.084) (0.487) (0.068) (0.058)
(C) LIBOR & Variable Rate FS/IV 0.119*** 0.617*** 0.126 0.023 0.361**
(N=1'381) (0.023) (0.198) (0.944) (0.181) (0.170)
(D) Special FS/IV 0.095*** 0.607*** -1.960 0.143 0.312
(N=991) (0.019) (0.190) (1.527) (0.236) (0.239)
Mortgage Supply
This  table shows  in Column (1) the fi rst-stage effects of origin push immigration on house prices, in Column (2) the effects 
of house prices on mortgage demand, and in Columns (3)-(5) the effect of house prices on mortgage supply. It shows 
these in panel (A) for our full  sample, in panel (B) only for mortgages whose rates are fixed for between 1 and 10 years. In
panel (C ) i t shows the effects only for Libor and variable rate mortgages, in panel (D) for "Special" mortgages with 
discounts for energy-efficient buildings, discounts for children, or initial discounts ("step mortgages"). Robust standard 
errors  in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
